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Abstract
Adversarial attacks for discrete data (such as
texts) have been proved significantly more
challenging than continuous data (such as im-
ages) since it is difficult to generate adversar-
ial samples with gradient-based methods. Cur-
rent successful attack methods for texts usually
adopt heuristic replacement strategies on the
character or word level, which remains chal-
lenging to find the optimal solution in the mas-
sive space of possible combinations of replace-
ments while preserving semantic consistency
and language fluency. In this paper, we pro-
pose BERT-Attack, a high-quality and effec-
tive method to generate adversarial samples
using pre-trained masked language models ex-
emplified by BERT. We turn BERT against its
fine-tuned models and other deep neural mod-
els in downstream tasks so that we can success-
fully mislead the target models to predict incor-
rectly. Our method outperforms state-of-the-
art attack strategies in both success rate and
perturb percentage, while the generated adver-
sarial samples are fluent and semantically pre-
served. Also, the cost of calculation is low,
thus possible for large-scale generations. The
code is available at https://github.com/
LinyangLee/BERT-Attack.
1 Introduction
Despite the success of deep learning, recent works
have found that these neural networks are vulnera-
ble to adversarial samples, which are crafted with
small perturbations to the original inputs (Goodfel-
low et al., 2014; Kurakin et al., 2016; Chakraborty
et al., 2018). That is, these adversarial samples are
imperceptible to human judges while they can mis-
lead the neural networks to incorrect predictions.
Therefore, it is essential to explore these adver-
sarial attack methods since the ultimate goal is to
make sure the neural networks are highly reliable
∗Corresponding author.
and robust. While in computer vision fields, both
attack strategies and their defense countermeasures
are well-explored (Chakraborty et al., 2018), the
adversarial attack for text is still challenging due
to the discrete nature of languages. Generating of
adversarial samples for texts needs to possess such
qualities: (1) imperceptible to human judges yet
misleading to neural models; (2) fluent in grammar
and semantically consistent with original inputs.
Previous methods craft adversarial samples
mainly based on specific rules (Li et al., 2018; Gao
et al., 2018; Yang et al., 2018; Alzantot et al., 2018;
Ren et al., 2019; Jin et al., 2019; Zang et al., 2020).
Therefore, these methods are difficult to guaran-
tee the fluency and semantically preservation in
the generated adversarial samples at the same time.
Plus, these manual craft methods are rather com-
plicated. They use multiple linguistic constraints
like NER tagging or POS tagging. Introducing
contextualized language models to serve as an au-
tomatic perturbation generator could make these
rules designing much easier.
The recent rise of pre-trained language models,
such as BERT (Devlin et al., 2018), push the per-
formances of NLP tasks to a new level. On the one
hand, the powerful ability of a fine-tuned BERT
on downstream tasks makes it more challenging to
be adversarial attacked (Jin et al., 2019). On the
other hand, BERT is a pre-trained masked language
model on extremely large-scale unsupervised data
and has learned general-purpose language knowl-
edge. Therefore, BERT has the potential to gener-
ate more fluent and semantic-consistent substitu-
tions for an input text. Naturally, both the proper-
ties of BERT motivate us to explore the possibility
of attacking a fine-tuned BERT with another BERT
as the attacker.
In this paper, we propose an effective and
high-quality adversarial sample generation method:
BERT-Attack, using BERT as a language model
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to generate adversarial samples. The core algo-
rithm of BERT-Attack is straightforward and con-
sists of two stages: finding the vulnerable words
in one given input sequence for the target model;
then applying BERT in a semantic-preserving way
to generate substitutes for the vulnerable words.
With the capability of BERT, the perturbations are
generated considering the context around. There-
fore, the perturbations are fluent and reasonable.
We use the masked language model as a perturba-
tion generator and find perturbations that maximize
the risk of making wrong predictions (Goodfellow
et al., 2014). Differently from previous attacking
strategies that require traditional single-direction
language models as a constraint, we only need to in-
ference the language model once as a perturbation
generator rather than repeatedly using language
models to score the generated adversarial samples
in a trial and error process.
Experimental results show that the proposed
BERT-Attack method successfully fooled its fine-
tuned downstream model with the highest attack
success rate compared with previous methods.
Meanwhile, the perturb percentage and the query
number are considerably lower, while the semantic
preservation is high.
To summarize our main contributions:
• We propose a simple and effective method,
named BERT-Attack, to effectively generate
fluent and semantically-preserved adversarial
samples that can successfully mislead state-
of-the-art models in NLP, such as fine-tuned
BERT for various downstream tasks.
• BERT-Attack has a higher attacking success
rate and a lower perturb percentage with fewer
access numbers to the target model compared
with previous attacking algorithms, while
does not require extra scoring models there-
fore extremely effective.
2 Related Work
To explore the robustness of neural networks, adver-
sarial attacks have been extensively studied for con-
tinuous data (such as images) (Goodfellow et al.,
2014; Nguyen et al., 2015; Chakraborty et al.,
2018). The key idea is to find a minimal pertur-
bation that maximizes the risk of making wrong
predictions. This minimax problem can be eas-
ily achieved by applying gradient descent over the
continuous space of images (Miyato et al., 2017).
However, adversarial attack for discrete data such
as text remains challenging.
Adversarial Attack for Text
Current successful attacks for text usually adopt
heuristic rules to modify the characters of a word
(Jin et al., 2019), and substituting words with syn-
onyms (Ren et al., 2019). Li et al. (2018); Gao
et al. (2018) apply perturbations based on word em-
beddings such as Glove (Pennington et al., 2014),
which is not strictly semantically and grammati-
cally coordinated. Alzantot et al. (2018) adopts lan-
guage models to score the perturbations generated
by searching for close meaning words in the word
embedding space (Mrksˇic´ et al., 2016), using a trial
and error process to find possible perturbations, yet
the perturbations generated are still not context-
aware and heavily rely on cosine similarity mea-
surement of word embeddings. Glove embeddings
do not guarantee similar vector space with cosine
similarity distance, therefore the perturbations are
less semantically consistent. Jin et al. (2019) apply
a semantically enhanced embedding (Mrksˇic´ et al.,
2016), which is context unaware, thus less consis-
tent with the unperturbed inputs. Liang et al. (2017)
use phrase-level insertion and deletion, which pro-
duces unnatural sentences inconsistent with the
original inputs, lacking fluency control. To pre-
serve semantic information, Glockner et al. (2018)
replace words manually to break the language in-
ference system (Bowman et al., 2015). Jia and
Liang (2017) propose manual craft methods to at-
tack machine reading comprehension systems. Lei
et al. (2019) introduce replacement strategies using
embedding transition.
Although the above approaches have achieved
good results, there is still much room for improve-
ment regarding the perturbed percentage, attacking
success rate, grammatical correctness and semantic
consistency, etc. Moreover, the substitution strate-
gies of these approaches are usually non-trivial,
resulting in that they are limited to specific tasks.
Adversarial Attack against BERT
Pre-trained language models have become main-
stream for many NLP tasks. Works such as (Wal-
lace et al., 2019; Jin et al., 2019; Pruthi et al., 2019)
have explored these pre-trained language models
from many different angles. Wallace et al. (2019)
explored the possible ethical problems of learned
knowledge in pre-trained models.
3 BERT-Attack
Motivated by the interesting idea of turning BERT
against BERT, we propose BERT-Attack, using
the original BERT model to craft adversarial sam-
ples to fool the fine-tuned BERT model.
Our method consists of two steps: (1) finding
the vulnerable words for the target model and then
(2) replacing them with the semantically similar
and grammatically correct words until a successful
attack.
The most-vulnerable words are the keywords
that help the target model make judgments. Pertur-
bations over these words can be most beneficial in
crafting adversarial samples. After finding which
words that we are aimed to replace, we use masked
language models to generate perturbations based
on the top-K predictions from the masked language
model.
3.1 Finding Vulnerable Words
Under the black-box scenario, the logit output by
the target model (fine-tuned BERT or other neural
models) is the only supervision we can get. We
first select the words in the sequence which have a
high significance influence on the final output logit.
Let S = [w0, · · · , wi · · · ] denote the input sen-
tence, and oy(S) denote the logit output by the
target model for correct label y, the importance
score Iwi is defined as
Iwi = oy(S)− oy(S\wi), (1)
where S\wi = [w0, · · · , wi−1, [MASK], wi+1, · · · ]
is the sentence after replacing wi with [MASK].
Then we rank all the words according to the
ranking score Iwi in descending order to create
word list L. We only take  percent of the most im-
portant words since we tend to keep perturbations
minimum.
This process maximizes the risk of making
wrong predictions, which is previously done by cal-
culating gradients in image domains. The problem
is then formulated as replacing these most vulner-
able words with semantically consistent perturba-
tions.
3.2 Word Replacement via BERT
After finding the vulnerable words, we iteratively
replace the words in list L one by one to find per-
turbations that can mislead the target model. Previ-
ous approaches usually use multiple human-crafted
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Figure 1: One step of our replacement strategy.
rules to ensure the generated example is seman-
tically consistent with the original one and gram-
matically correct, such as a synonym dictionary
(Ren et al., 2019), POS checker (Jin et al., 2019),
semantic similarity checker (Jin et al., 2019), etc.
Alzantot et al. (2018) applies a traditional language
model to score the perturbed sentence at every at-
tempt of replacing a word.
These strategies of generating substitutes are un-
aware of the context between the substitution po-
sitions (usually using language models to test the
substitutions), thus are insufficient in fluency con-
trol and semantic consistency. More importantly,
using language models or POS checkers in scoring
the perturbed samples is costly since this trial and
error process requires massive inference time.
To overcome the lack of fluency control and se-
mantic preservation by using synonyms or simi-
lar words in the embedding space, we leverage
BERT for word replacement. The genuine na-
ture of the masked language model makes sure
that the generated sentences are relatively fluent
and grammar-correct, also preserve most semantic
information, which is later confirmed by human
evaluators. Further, compared with previous ap-
proaches using rule-based perturbation strategies,
the masked language model prediction is context-
aware, thus dynamically searches for perturbations
rather than simple synonyms replacing.
Different from previous methods using compli-
cated strategies to score and constrain the pertur-
bations, the contextualized perturbation generator
generates minimal perturbations with only one for-
ward pass. Without running additional neural mod-
els to score the sentence, the time-consuming part
is accessing the target model only. Therefore the
process is extremely efficient.
Algorithm 1 BERT-Attack
1: procedure WORD IMPORTANCE RANKING
2: S = [w0, w1, · · · ] // input: tokenized sentence
3: Y ← gold-label
4: for wi in S do
5: calculate importance score Iwi using Eq. 1
6: select word list L = [wtop−1, wtop−2, · · · ]
7: // sort S using Iwi in descending order and collect top−K words
8: procedure REPLACEMENT USING BERT
9: H = [h0, · · · , hn] // sub-word tokenized sequence of S
10: generate top-K candidates for all sub-words using BERT and get P∈n×K
11: for wj in L do
12: if wj is a whole word then
13: get candidate C = Filter(P j)
14: replace word wj
15: else
16: get candidate C using PPL ranking and Filter
17: replace sub-words [hj , · · · , hj+t]
18: Find Possible Adversarial Sample
19: for ck in C do
20: S
′
= [w0, · · · , wj−1, ck, · · · ] // attempt
21: if argmax(oy(S
′
))! = Y then
22: return Sadv = S′ // success attack
23: else
24: if oy(S
′
) < oy(S
adv) then
25: Sadv = [w0, · · · , wj−1, c, · · · ] // do one perturbation
26: return None
Thus, using the masked language model as a
contextualized perturbation generator can be one
possible solution to craft high-quality adversarial
samples efficiently.
3.2.1 Word Replacement Strategy
As seen in Figure 1, given a chosen word w to
be replaced, we apply BERT to predict the pos-
sible words that are similar to w yet can mislead
the target model. Instead of following the masked
language model settings, we do not mask the cho-
sen word w and use the original sequence as input,
which can generate more semantic-consistent sub-
stitutes (Zhou et al., 2019). For instance, given a
sequence ”I like the cat.”, if we mask the word cat,
it would be very hard for a masked language model
to predict the original word cat since it could be
just as fluent if the sequence is ”I like the dog.”.
Further, if we mask out the given word w, for each
iteration we would have to rerun the masked lan-
guage model prediction process which is costly.
Since BERT uses Bytes-Pair-Encoding (BPE)
to tokenize the sequence S = [w0, · · · , wi, · · · ]
into sub-word tokens: H = [h0, h1, h2, · · · ], we
need to align the chosen word to its corresponding
sub-words in BERT.
Let M denote the BERT model, we feed the
tokenized sequence H into the BERT M to get
output prediction P = M(H). Instead of using
the argmax prediction, we take the most possible
K predictions at each position, where K is a hyper-
parameter.
We iterate words that are sorted by word impor-
tance ranking process to find perturbations. The
BERT model uses BPE encoding to construct vo-
cabularies. While most words are still single words,
rare words are tokenized into sub-words. Therefore,
we treat single words and sub-words separately to
generate the substitutes.
Single words For a single word wj , we make
attempts using the corresponding top-K predic-
tion candidates P j . We first filter out stop words
collected from NLTK; for sentiment classifica-
tion tasks we filter out antonyms using synonym
dictionaries (Mrksˇic´ et al., 2016) since BERT
masked language model does not distinguish syn-
onyms and antonyms. Then for given candi-
date ck we construct a perturbed sequence H
′
=
[h0, · · · , hj−1, ck, hj+1 · · · ]. If the target model is
already fooled to predict incorrectly, we break the
loop to obtain the final adversarial sample Hadv;
otherwise, we select from the filtered candidates
to pick one best perturbation and turn to the next
word in word list L.
Sub-words For a word that is tokenized into sub-
words in BERT, we cannot obtain its substitutes
directly. Thus we use the perplexity of sub-word
combinations to find suitable word substitutes from
predictions in the sub-word level. Given sub-words
[h0, h1, · · · , ht] of word w, we list all possible
combinations from the prediction P∈t×K fromM,
which is Kt sub-word combinations, we can con-
vert them back to normal words by reversing the
BERT tokenization process. We feed these combi-
nations into the BERT-MLM to get the perplexity
of these combinations. Then we rank the perplexity
of all combinations to get the top-K combinations
to find the suitable sub-word combinations.
Given the suitable perturbations, we replace the
original word with the most likely perturbation and
repeat this process by iterating the importance word
ranking list to find the final adversarial sample.
In this way, we acquire the adversarial samples
Sadv effectively since we only iterate the masked
language model once and do perturbations using
the masked language model without other checking
strategies.
We summarize the two-step BERT-Attack pro-
cess in Algorithm 1.
4 Experiments
4.1 Datasets
We apply our method to attack different types of
NLP tasks in the form of text classification and
natural language inference. Following Jin et al.
(2019), we evaluate our method on 1k test samples
randomly selected from the test set of the given task
which are the same splits used by Alzantot et al.
(2018); Jin et al. (2019). The GA method only uses
a subset of 50 samples in the FAKE, IMDB dataset.
Text Classification We use different types of text
classification tasks to study the effectiveness of our
method.
• Yelp Review classification dataset, containing.
Following Zhang et al. (2015), we process the
dataset to construct a polarity classification
task.
• IMDB Document-level movie review dataset,
where the average sequence length is longer
than the Yelp dataset. We process the dataset
into a polarity classification task 1.
• AG’s News Sentence level news-type classi-
fication dataset, containing 4 types of news:
World, Sports, Business, and Science.
• FAKE Fake News Classification dataset, de-
tecting whether a news document is fake from
Kaggle Fake News Challenge 2.
Natural Language Inference
• SNLI Stanford language inference task (Bow-
man et al., 2015). Given one premise and one
hypothesis, and the goal is to predict if the hy-
pothesis is entailment, neural, or contradiction
of the premise.
• MNLI Language inference dataset on multi-
genre texts, covering transcribed speech, pop-
ular fiction, and government reports (Williams
et al., 2018), which is more complicated with
diversified written and spoken style texts, com-
pared with the SNLI dataset, including eval
data matched with training domains and eval
data mismatched with training domains.
4.2 Automatic Evaluation Metrics
To measure the quality of the generated samples,
we set up various automatic evaluation metrics.
The success rate, which is the counter-part of after-
attack accuracy, is the core metric measuring the
success of the attacking method. Meanwhile, the
perturbed percentage is also crucial since, gen-
erally, less perturbation results in more semantic
consistency. Further, under the black-box setting,
queries of the target model are the only accessible
information. Constant queries for one sample is
less applicable. Thus query number per sample
is also a key metric. As used in TextFooler (Jin
et al., 2019), we also use Universal Sentence En-
coder (Cer et al., 2018) to measure the semantic
consistency between the adversarial sample and the
original sequence. To balance between semantic
preservation and attack success rate, we set up a
threshold of semantic similarity score to filter the
less similar examples.
1https://datasets.imdbws.com/
2https://www.kaggle.com/c/fake-news/data
Dataset Method Original Acc Attacked Acc Perturb % Query Number Avg Len Semantic Sim
Fake
BERT-Attack(ours)
97.8
15.5 1.1 1558
885
0.81
TextFooler(Jin et al., 2019) 19.3 11.7 4403 0.76
GA(Alzantot et al., 2018) 58.3 1.1 28508 -
Yelp
BERT-Attack(ours)
95.6
5.1 4.1 273
157
0.77
TextFooler 6.6 12.8 743 0.74
GA 31.0 10.1 6137 -
IMDB
BERT-Attack(ours)
90.9
11.4 4.4 454
215
0.86
TextFooler 13.6 6.1 1134 0.86
GA 45.7 4.9 6493 -
AG
BERT-Attack(ours)
94.2
10.6 15.4 213
43
0.63
TextFooler 12.5 22.0 357 0.57
GA 51 16.9 3495 -
SNLI
BERT-Attack(ours)
89.4(H/P)
7.4/16.1 12.4/9.3 16/30
8/18
0.40/0.55
TextFooler 4.0/20.8 18.5/33.4 60/142 0.45/0.54
GA 14.7/- 20.8/- 613/- -
MNLI
BERT-Attack(ours)
85.1(H/P)
7.9/11.9 8.8/7.9 19/44
11/21
0.55/0.68
matched TextFooler 9.6/25.3 15.2/26.5 78/152 0.57/0.65
GA 21.8/- 18.2/- 692/- -
MNLI
BERT-Attack(ours)
82.1(H/P)
7/13.7 8.0/7.1 24/43
12/22
0.53/0.69
mismatched TextFooler 8.3/22.9 14.6/24.7 86/162 0.58/0.65
GA 20.9/- 19.0/- 737/- -
Table 1: Results of attacking against various fine-tuned BERT models. TextFooler is the state-of-the-art baseline.
For MNLI task, we attack the hypothesis(H) or premises(P) separately.
4.3 Attacking Results
As shown in Table 1, the BERT-Attack method suc-
cessfully fool its downstream fine-tuned model. In
both text classification and natural language infer-
ence tasks, the fine-tuned BERTs fail to classify
the generated adversarial samples correctly.
The average after-attack accuracy is lower than
10%, indicating that most samples are successfully
perturbed to fool the state-of-the-art classification
models. Meanwhile, the perturb percentage is less
than 10 %, which is significantly less than previous
works.
Further, BERT-Attack successfully attacked all
tasks listed, which are in diversified domains such
as News classification, review classification, lan-
guage inference in different domains. The results
indicate that the attacking method is robust in dif-
ferent tasks. Compared with the strong baseline
introduced by Jin et al. (2019)3 and Alzantot et al.
(2018)4, the BERT-Attack method is more efficient
3https://github.com/jind11/TextFooler
4https://github.com/QData/TextAttack
and more imperceptible. The query number and the
perturbation percentage of our method are much
less.
We can observe that it is generally easier to at-
tack the review classification task since the perturb
percentage is incredibly low. BERT-Attack can
mislead the target model by replacing a handful of
words only. Since the average sequence length is
relatively long, the target model tends to make judg-
ments by only a few words in a sequence, which is
not the natural way of human prediction. Thus, the
perturbation of these keywords would result in in-
correct prediction from the target model, revealing
the vulnerability of it.
4.4 Human Evaluations
For further evaluation of the generated adversarial
samples, we set up human evaluations to measure
the quality of the generated samples in fluency and
grammar as well as semantic preservation.
We ask human judges to score the grammar cor-
rectness of the mixed sentences of generated ad-
versarial samples and original sequences, scoring
from 1-5 following Jin et al. (2019). Then we ask
human judges to make predictions in a shuffled mix
of original and adversarial texts. We use the IMDB
dataset and the MNLI dataset, and for each task, we
select 100 samples of both original and adversarial
samples for human judges. We ask three human
annotators to evaluate the examples. For label pre-
diction, we take the majority class as the predicted
label, and for semantic and grammar check we use
an average score among the annotators.
Seen in Table 2, the semantic score and the gram-
mar score of the adversarial samples are close to
the original ones. MNLI task is a sentence pair
prediction task constructed by human crafted hy-
potheses based on the premises, therefore original
pairs share a considerable amount of same words.
Perturbations on these words would make it diffi-
cult for human judges to predict correctly therefore
the accuracy is lower than simple sentence classifi-
cation tasks.
Dataset Accuracy Semantic Grammar
MNLI Original 0.90 3.9 4.0Adversarial 0.70 3.7 3.6
IMDB Original 0.91 4.1 3.9Adversarial 0.85 3.9 3.7
Table 2: Human-Evaluation Results.
4.5 BERT-Attack against Other Models
The BERT-Attack method is also applicable in
attacking other target models, not limited to its
fine-tuned model only. As seen in Table 3, the
attack is successful against LSTM-based models,
indicating that BERT-Attack is feasible for a wide
range of models. Under BERT-Attack, the ESIM
model is more robust in the MNLI dataset. We as-
sume that encoding two sentences separately gets
higher robustness. In attacking BERT-large models,
the performance is also excellent, indicating that
BERT-Attack is successful in attacking different
pre-trained models not only against its own fine-
tuned downstream models.
5 Ablations and Discussions
5.1 Importance of Candidate Numbers
The candidate pool range is the major hyper-
parameter used in the BERT-Attack algorithm. As
seen in Figure 2, the attack rate is rising along with
the candidate size increasing. Intuitively, a larger
Dataset Model Ori Acc Atk Acc Perturb %
IMDB Word-LSTM 89.8 10.2 2.7
BERT-Large 98.2 12.4 2.9
Yelp Word-LSTM 96.0 1.1 4.7
BERT-Large 97.9 8.2 4.1
MNLI ESIM 76.2 9.6 21.7
matched BERT-Large 86.4 13.2 7.4
Table 3: BERT-Attack against other models.
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Figure 2: Using different candidate number K in the
attacking process.
K would result in less semantic similarity. How-
ever, the semantic measure via Universal Sentence
Encoder is maintained in a stable range, (experi-
ments show that semantic similarities drop less than
2%), indicating that the candidates are all reason-
able and semantically consistent with the original
sentence.
Further, a fixed candidate number could be rigid
in practical usage, so we run a test using a threshold
to cut off candidates that are less possible as a
plausible perturbation.
As seen in Table 4, when using a flexible thresh-
old to cut off unsuitable candidates, the attacking
process has a lower query number. This indicates
that some candidates predicted by the masked lan-
guage model with a lower prediction score may
not be meaningful so skipping these candidates can
save the unnecessary queries.
Dataset Method Ori Acc Atk Acc Queries %
IMDB Fixed-K 90.9 11.4 454
With Threshold 90.9 12.4 440
Table 4: Flexible Candidates Using a threshold to cut
off unsuitable candidates.
5.2 Importance of Sequence Length
The BERT-Attack method is based on the contextu-
alized masked language model. Thus the sequence
length plays an important role in the high-quality
perturbation process. As seen, instead of the previ-
ous methods focusing on attacking the hypothesis
of the NLI task, we aim at premises whose aver-
age length is longer. This is because we believe
that contextual replacement would be less reason-
able when dealing with extremely short sequences.
To avoid such a problem, we believe that many
word-level synonym replacement strategies can be
combined with BERT-Attack, allowing the BERT-
Attack method to be more applicable.
Dataset Method Ori Acc Atk Acc Perturb %
MNLI BERT-Atk 85.1 7.9 8.8
matched +Adv Train 84.6 23.1 10.5
Table 5: Adversarial training results.
Dataset Model LSTM BERT-base BERT-large
IMDB
Word-LSTM - 0.78 0.75
BERT-base 0.83 - 0.71
BERT-large 0.87 0.86 -
Dataset Model ESIM BERT-base BERT-large
MNLI
ESIM - 0.59 0.60
BERT-base 0.60 - 0.45
BERT-large 0.59 0.43 -
Table 6: Transferability analysis using attacked accu-
racy as the evaluation metric. The column is the target
model used in attack, and the row is the tested model.
5.3 Transferability and Adversarial Training
To test the transferability of the generated adver-
sarial samples, we take samples aimed at different
target models to attack other target models. Here,
we use BERT-base as the masked language model
for all different target models. As seen in Table
6, samples are transferable in NLI task while less
transferable in text classification.
Meanwhile, we further fine-tune the target model
using the generated adversarial samples from the
train set and then test it on the test set used before.
As seen in Table 5, generated samples used in fine-
tuning help the target model become more robust
while accuracy is close to the model trained with
clean datasets. The attack becomes more difficult,
indicating that the model is harder to be attacked.
Therefore, the generated dataset can be used as
additional data for further exploration of making
neural models more robust.
Dataset Model Atk Acc Perturb % Semantic
Yelp BERT-Atk 5.1 4.1 0.77
w/o sub-word 7.1 4.3 0.74
MNLI BERT-Atk 11.9 7.9 0.68
w/o sub-word 14.7 9.3 0.63
Table 7: Effects on sub-word level attack.
5.4 Effects on Sub-Word Level Attack
BPE method is currently the most efficient way to
deal with a large number of words, as used in BERT.
We establish a comparative experiment where we
do not use the sub-word level attack. That is we
skip those words that are tokenized with multiple
sub-words.
As seen in Table 7, using the sub-word level
attack can achieve higher performances, not only
in higher attacking success rate but also in less
perturbation percentage.
Dataset Method Atk Acc Perturb % Semantic
MNLI
MIR 7.9 8.8 0.68
matched Random 20.2 12.2 0.60
LIR 27.2 15.0 0.60
Table 8: Most Importance Ranking (MIR) vs Least Im-
portance Ranking (LIR)
5.5 Effects on Word Importance Ranking
Word importance ranking strategy is supposed to
find keys that are essential to NN models, which
is very much like calculating the maximum risk of
wrong predictions in the FGSM algorithm (Good-
fellow et al., 2014). When not using word im-
portance ranking, the attacking algorithm is less
successful.
Dataset Method Runtime(s/sample)
IMDB
BERT-Attack(w/o BPE) 14.2
BERT-Attack(w/ BPE) 16.0
Textfooler(Jin et al., 2019) 42.4
GA(Alzantot et al., 2018) 2582.0
Table 9: Runtime comparison.
Dataset Label
MNLI
Ori Some rooms have balconies . Hypothesis All of the rooms have balconies off of them . Contradiction
Adv Many rooms have balconies . Hypothesis All of the rooms have balconies off of them . Neutral
IMDB
Ori
it is hard for a lover of the novel northanger abbey to sit through this bbc adaptation and to Negative
keep from throwing objects at the tv screen... why are so many facts concerning the tilney
family and mrs . tilney ’ s death altered unnecessarily ? to make the story more ‘ horrible ? ’
Adv
it is hard for a lover of the novel northanger abbey to sit through this bbc adaptation and to Positive
keep from throwing objects at the tv screen... why are so many facts concerning the tilney
family and mrs . tilney ’ s death altered unnecessarily ? to make the plot more ‘ horrible ? ’
IMDB
Ori
i first seen this movie in the early 80s .. it really had nice picture quality too . anyways , i ’m Positive
glad i found this movie again ... the part i loved best was when he hijacked the car from this
poor guy... this is a movie i could watch over and over again . i highly recommend it .
Adv
i first seen this movie in the early 80s .. it really had nice picture quality too . anyways , i ’m Negative
glad i found this movie again ... the part i loved best was when he hijacked the car from this
poor guy... this is a movie i could watch over and over again . i inordinately recommend it .
Table 10: Some generated adversarial samples. Origin label is the correct prediction while label is adverse predic-
tion. Only red color parts are perturbed. We only attack premises in MNLI task. Text in FAKE dataset and IMDB
dataset is cut to fit in the table. Original text contains more than 200 words.
5.6 Runtime Comparison
Since BERT-Attack does not use language mod-
els or sentence encoders to measure the output se-
quence during the generation process, also, the
query number is lower, therefore the runtime is
faster than previous methods. As seen in Table
9, BERT-Attack is much faster than generic algo-
rithm (Alzantot et al., 2018) and 3 times faster then
Textfooler.
5.7 Examples of Generated Adversarial
Sentences
As seen in Table 10, the generated adversarial sam-
ples are semantically consistent with its original
input, while the target model makes incorrect pre-
dictions. In both review classification samples and
language inference samples, the perturbations do
not mislead human judges.
6 Conclusion
In this work, we propose a high-quality and effec-
tive method BERT-Attack to generate adversarial
samples using BERT masked language model. Ex-
periment results show that the proposed method
achieves a high success rate while maintaining a
minimum perturbation. Nevertheless, candidates
generated from the masked language model can
sometimes be antonyms or irrelevant to the original
words, causing a semantic loss. Thus, enhancing
language models to generate more semantically re-
lated perturbations can be one possible solution to
perfect BERT-Attack in the future.
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